

1 Ashtiani's First Request for production of documents and things:
2 specifically document requests 3,4,6,7,8,9,13,24,32,35, AND 36
3 Ashtiani also moves for an order that CMI pay to the moving
4 party the sum of \$ 2000.00 ^(T.H.) as the reasonable costs and time of
5 self representation, studies , research and transportation to
6 and from the law library. Self-representation fees incurred by
7 the moving party in connection with this proceeding, pursuant to
8 Rule 37(a) (4) (A) Fed R. CIV. P. This motion seeks to compel
9 production of documents relevant to the subject matter of the
10 action, not privileged, and the refusal to respond is without
11 justification. This motion is based on this notice and motion,
12 the memorandum of points and authorities subjoined hereto and
13 the Declaration of Tony H. Ashtiani pro se plaintiff filed
14 herewith, Ashtiani's First Request for Production of Documents
15 and things, and Defendant's Answer to plaintiff's First Request
16 for Production of Documents.

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Respectfully submitted,

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
Dated this 7TH. day of October , 2003.

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Tony H. Ashtiani

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Plaintiff

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MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES

I. INTRODUCTION

On June 16 ,2003 Plaintiff Tony H. Ashtiani (hereinafter Ashtiani) served on Defendant Continental Micronesia, inc. (hereinafter "CMI") a First Request for Production of documents **Exhibit A.** CMI responded with Defendant's Answers to Plaintiff's First Production OF documents hereinafter "Answer to Request for production" Or "Document Request (#)". **Exhibit B.**

10 In its answer to request for production, CMI objects to,
11 and fails to comply with, several of Ashtiani's discovery
12 requests. This Memorandum addresses the following issues raised
13 by CMI's objections:

15 1) Whether Ashtiani document requests 3,4,13,32, and, 35 seek
16 "Objection is being made on grounds of overbreadth as to time
17 frame and substances, and not being reasonable calculated to
18 lead to discovery of admissible evidence.

20 2) Whether Ashtiani may obtain information requested in
21 Document requests 7(a), and 8 "if these items can be obtained
22 and appear to be discoverable in this action they will be
23 produced." Since no additional information was provided
24 plaintiff nor was any disclosure made, a compel order may be
25 necessary.

1 3) Whether Ashtiani may obtain information requested in
2 Document requests 3,4,9,13,24,32, and 35 objection being made as
3 to relevancy.

4

5 4) Whether Ashtiani may obtain information requested in
6 Document requests 3,4,7,8,9,13,24,32, and 35 objection being made
7 as to overbreadth, relevancy, and burdensomeness. The responses
8 also state that if the requested items exist and appear to be
9 discoverable, they will be produced. To date no documents were
10 produced nor any objection made to their production.

11

12 5) Whether Ashtiani may obtain information requested in
13 Document requests 3,4,13, and 32 information sought which is
14 allegedly confidential, private and personal, and the disclosure
15 of it would necessarily invade the privacy, and expectation of
16 privacy, or persons not parties to this suit." It should be
17 noted that no objections is being made by the individuals whose
18 privacy is allegedly invaded. Instead, CMI -- who has already
19 invaded these individuals' privacy and have collected the
20 information in its files -- is now showing a great deal of
21 concern for their privacy.

22

23 6) Whether Ashtiani may obtain at the minimum referred to
24 in document requests 6, and 36 (relating to plaintiff's first
25 knowledge of termination and internal investigations of

1 Defendant Hammer survey, done by electronic means by his own
2 supervisors.) withheld by CMI. ("hiding the ball").

3

4 Document Production Request 3 and 4 seek in various forms
5 information relating to promotion of Mr. Dixon McKenzie and Mr.
6 James Hammer seeks key document in relationship to promotion of
7 new management versus termination of minorities, it is a general
8 knowledge that many benefits of locals and minorities even in
9 transfer rights were deprived by Mr. Dixon McKenzie. Plaintiff
10 asserts this crucial piece of information will shed light on
11 this case, specifically, as the date Mr. McKenzie became
12 director of Human resources, which resulted in dispossessing
13 minorities, due to failure to investigate discrimination
14 complaint and in house investigation, leading to isolation,
15 depression, stress of the minority group and their lives.
16 Causing stress, anxiety, depression that was generated by the
17 hostile work condition. McKenzie's failure of in-house
18 investigation is the direct result of this statistical data.

19

20 **II. ARGUMENT**

21

22 Ashtiani, an individual of minority, alleges that CMI
23 discriminated against him in his employment because he is an
24 individual of Middle Eastern background. Ashtiani will prove
25 "national origin" and "disparate treatment theory" Green vs.

1 McDonald Douglas, 411 U.S. 792, 804, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 1825 (1973)
2 Heagney v. University of Washington 642 F. 2d 1157, 1163 (9th
3 cir. 1981).

4

5 Ashtiani also alleges that CMI violated his civil rights by
6 its failure to provide relief from disparate treatment action
7 inflicted by supervisor Mr. Glenn Mendoza an employee of CMI,
8 who was Ashtiani's immediate supervisor. Ashtiani was forced by
9 defendant's conduct to trade days off from his employment, in
10 part, for relief from this "hostile work environment."

11

12 All the disputed discovery requests are discoverable
13 evidence pursuant to rule 26(a) (1) (B) and (b) (1) to obtain
14 statistical data or other relevant information that may prove
15 that he was subject to a retaliatory "hostile work environment,"
16 and that CMI adhered to a "pattern and practice" of intentional
17 discrimination in employment decisions effecting individuals of
18 minorities, including Ashtiani, or that CMI's employment
19 practices had a discriminatory impact. In order to present such
20 evidence, plaintiff is seeking documentary evidence which might
21 provide him with the raw data needed for the evaluation and
22 presentation of such evidence at trial.

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1 A. THE TEST FOR DETERMINATING WHETHER MATERIAL IS
2 DISCOVERABLE IS RELEVENCY.

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4 In its response to documents requests 3,4,9,13,24,32, and 35
5 CMI objects on the grounds that Ashtiani's request seek
6 "production of documents that are neither relevant nor
7 reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of relevant and
8 admissible evidence" As stated in Kerr v. United States Dist. Ct
9 for north. Dist. Of California, 511 F.2d 192, 196 (9th Cir. 1975),
10 aff'd, 426 U.S. 394, 96 S.Ct. 2119, 48 L.Ed.2d 725 (1976):

11
12 The question of relevancy is to be more
13 Loosely construed at the discovery stage
14 than at the trial. Under F.R.C.P. 26(b)
15 (1) it is no ground for objection that
16 information sought in pretrial discovery
17 would not be admissible at trial if the
18 testimony sought appears reasonably
19 calculated to lead to the discovery
20 of admissible evidence.

21 As further stated in Jones v. Commander, Kansas Army Ammunitions
22 plant, 147 F.R.D. 248, 250 (D.KAN.1993) (emphasis added):

23
24 Relevancy has been defined as encompassing any
25 matter that bears on, or that reasonably could
 lead to other matters that could bear on, any
 issue that or may be in the case. Discovery is
 not limited to issues by pleadings, for discovery
 itself is designed to help define and clarify the
 issues. . . . A request for discovery should be
 considered relevant if there is any possibility
 that the information sought may be relevant to
 the subject matter of the action. Discovery

1 should ordinarily be allowed under the concept
2 of relevancy unless it is clear that the information
3 sought can have no possible bearing upon the
subject matter of the action. (Citations omitted;
emphasis added.)

4

5 "Information is regarded as 'relevant to the subject
6 matter' if it might reasonably assist a party in evaluating the
7 case, preparing for trial, or facilitating settlement thereof. .
8 . . ." CERAMIC Corp. Of America V. Inka Maritime Corp., 163
9 F.R.D 584,587 (C.D.CAL. 1995) (emphasis in original).

10

11 As will be further discussed bellow, document requests
12 13,24,32, and 35 are relevant because Ashtiani intends to rely on
13 them to compile statistical evidence indicating that CMI's
14 pervasively discriminates against minorities, including
15 plaintiff, through its disparate treatment policies against
16 pacific islanders and local hires. Thus, for instance, in order
17 to meet his burden plaintiff could show, through circumstantial,
18 statistical or direct evidence that the discharge occurred under
19 circumstances giving rise to an inference of discrimination.

20 Wallis v. J.R. Simplot Co., 26 F.3d 885, 891 (9th Cir.1994).
21 Ashtiani can meet his burden by showing that defendant had a
22 continuing need for his skills and services in his various
23 duties. Id. Despite DC-10's departing from CMI'S fleet and being
24 replaced with new generation Jets.

1 Plaintiff could also establish a prima facie case of
2 discrimination by offering direct evidence of defendant's
3 discriminatory motives. See, Schnidrig v. Columbia Mach., Inc.,
4 80 F.3d 1406, 1409-10 (9th Cir.1996).

5

6 Document requests 3,4,6,7,8,9, and, 36 are relevant
7 because Ashtiani may rely on them as direct or circumstantial
8 evidence of either intentional discrimination and that hiring,
9 firing, and employment evaluation practices have a desperate
10 impact including Ashtiani.

11

12 Document Requests 13,24,32, and 35 are directly relevant as
13 they refer to investigations of national origin discrimination
14 and harassment, respectively.

15

16 Document Request 7,8 in the First Request are relevant
17 because it is clear from the course of discovery to date that
18 CMI intends to place in issue Defendant Ashtiani's attendance
19 reports level 1 thru 6 which does not even exist. CMI plans to
20 argue that these manufactured reports are valid.

21

22 B. THE SCOPE OF DISCOVERY THROUGH REQUESTS FOR
23 PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS IS LIMITED ONLY BY RELEVANCE
24 AND BURDENSONESS.

25

1 The scope of discovery through requests for production of
2 documents is broad, giving access to documents, which will lead
3 to evidence necessary to prove the complaint. An opposing party
4 can defeat a discovery request only by demonstrating an absence
5 of relevance and unusual burdensomeness. In order to proceed to
6 trial or his racial discrimination claim, Plaintiff Ashtiani
7 must establish a prima facie case of discrimination. A company's
8 statistical information is routinely used to meet the prima
9 facie burden. Plaintiff's national origin discrimination case
10 will be proven in whole by demonstrating that Defendant CMI
11 routinely and pervasively discriminates against racial
12 minorities, for instance, Pacific Islanders, and including
13 Ashtiani. A commonly accepted way to demonstrate such
14 discrimination is through the company's own statistical and
15 employment records. In Rich v. Martin Marietta Corp., 522 F.2d
16 333, 343, (10th Cir. 1975) the court of appeals held that the
17 district court erred in denying plaintiffs the right to discover
18 information and statistics withheld by the defendant regarding
19 hiring, firing, promotion and demotion of Blacks, Hispanics and
20 women on a plant-wide basis and within individual departments.
21 Id. at 344-345. The court of appeals rationale was, in part,
22 that defendant was able to rely on its own plant-wide
23 information to compile statistical evidence to disprove
24 plaintiff's prima facie case of employment discrimination. Id.
25 at 343. The court of appeals also stated that:

1
2 In an EEOC case the discovery scope is extensive.

3 . . . If the information sought promises to be
4 particularly cogent to the case, the defendant must
5 require shouldering the burden . . . Whether . . .
6 The action is by a Plaintiff or by the government,
7 the object [of The case] is "the elimination of
8 employment discrimination, whether practiced
9 knowingly or unconsciously and in relation to
employment or advancement criteria which, although
neutral on its face, is discriminatory in its
application. Information relevant in an EEOC
investigation is equally relevant to litigation
brought by a private party. Id., at 343, 344.

10
11 All Document Requests of Ashtiani's document requests seek
12 some form of employment or personnel record created and
13 maintained by CMI.

14 CMI objects that such document requests are extraordinarily
15 overbroad [or] unduly burdensome," and/or that such document
16 requests seek "disclosure of sensitive information of a personal
17 nature." While Defendant is unable to comply as it has no
18 document in its possession responsive to this request.
19

20 Orbovich v. Macalester College, 119 F.R.D. 411, 416 (D.
21 Minn. 1988). Following the Court of Appeals' rationale in Rich,
22 supra, Ashtiani should be permitted discovery of the documents
23 requested because CMI will be able to rely on the same in its
24 defense of this case.
25

1 CMI also objects to Ashtiani's document requests 3,4,13, and
2 32 claiming they seek information "which is confidential,
3 private and personal and the disclosure of it would necessarily
4 invade the privacy, and expectation of privacy" CMI's objections
5 on those grounds are insufficient. CMI has made no claim that
6 documents in its possession that contain "sensitive information
7 of a personal nature" are protected by any privilege recognized
8 under and Guam Federal common law of privilege and under Federal
9 statute of 42 USC 2000e3 can not be withheld. Garrett v. City
10 and County of San Francisco, 818 F2d 1515, 1519 n. 6 (9th Cir.
11 1987). Neither is a reasonable expectation of privacy created
12 under, e.g., the California State Constitution entitled to
13 recognition in a federal question case. Ceramic Corp., supra,
14 163 F.R.D. at 588. The federal Title VII interest in the
15 "elimination of employment discrimination" (Rich, supra, 522
16 F.2d at 344) is in such conflict with a state doctrine promoting
17 confidentiality that it need not be taken into account even as a
18 matter of comity. Finally, as stated above, while the
19 individuals whose privacy is allegedly invaded do not register
20 an objection to the discovery, CMI who has no privacy interest
21 at stake (it does not raise such objection) should not be
22 allowed to use others' purported privileges to plaintiff's
23 disadvantage.

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1 Despite documents' allegedly confidential nature and the
2 burdensomeness of the requests, plaintiffs in numerous Title VII
3 cases have been permitted to discover employment and personnel
4 records from Defendant employers. See, e.g., Rich, supra, 522
5 F.2d at 344, 345; Garrett, supra, 818 F.2d at 1519 (Discovery of
6 personnel files permitted to determine whether similarly
7 situated firefighters were treated differently on the basis of
8 race); Kerr, supra, 511 F.2d at 196 (Discovery of personnel
9 records of prison officials permitted to prove that member and
10 executive personnel have no expertise at arriving at fair
11 decisions with regards to parole, sentencing and disciplinary
12 proceedings in civil rights action); Orbovich, supra, 119 F.R.D.
13 at 415 (Discovery of tenure review and personnel files of all
14 other faculty members was permitted for purposes of comparing
15 treatments of genders in alleged discriminatory tenure denial;
16 E.E.O.C. v. University of New Mexico, 504 F.2d 1296, 1299 (10th
17 Cir. 1974) (Discovery of personnel files of all College of
18 Engineering faculty members permitted in action alleging
19 discriminatory termination based on national origin); Weahkee v.
20 Norton, 621 F.2d 1080, 1082 (10th Cir. 1980) (Discovery of
21 qualifications and job records of employees hired or promoted in
22 discriminatory preference over plaintiff was permitted).

23
24 Despite the fact that Ashtiani's document requests may
25 generate a large amount of documents and seek employment

1 information not normally made public, each of these requests is
2 designed to assist Ashtiani in evaluation of his national origin
3 discrimination and retaliatory "hostile work environment"
4 claims. CMI has already denied any national origin
5 discrimination. These documents will help sustain or refute that
6 defense.

7

8 For instance, documents 24 "referring or relating to Mr.
9 McKenzie's involvement or Mr. James Hammer participation or
10 involvement in decision making concerning employee's
11 termination" as the two individuals had terminated a African
12 American, a Chinese National, Mr. Bruce Lee and Ashtiani.
13 Document Request 3,4,13,24,32, and 35 may reveal a pattern or
14 practice of discrimination against minorities and its ripple
15 effect.

16

17 **C. GENERALIZED STATISTICAL DATA IS RELEVANT BECAUSE IT MAY**
BE USED TO ESTABLISH A GENERAL DISCRIMINATORY PATTERN IN AN
EMPLOYER'S HIRING, TERMINATION, COMPENSATION OR PROMOTION
PRACTICES.

18

19

20 Plaintiff has alleged that he was discriminated against
21 because of his national origin. Part of his claim is that CMI
22 treated him differently than majority. Part of his claim is
23 also that this treatment had disparate impact on him.
24 Statistical evidence is relevant to establish a prima facie case
25 of national origin discrimination under either a "disparate

1 impact" or "disparate treatment" theory. Rich, supra, 522 F.2d
2 at 345 (disparate impact), Heagney, supra, 642 F.2d at 1164,
3 Lowe v. City of Monrovia, 775 F.2d 998, 1008 (9th Cir. 1985)
4 (disparate treatment).

5

6 Furthermore, under a "disparate impact" theory, Ashtiani
7 may rely on statistical evidence to prove that any "business
8 necessity" defense forwarded by CMI is pretextual. Rich, supra,
9 522 F.2d at 345. Similarly, under a "disparate treatment"
10 theory, Ashtiani may rely on statistical evidence to prove that
11 CMI's "articulated nondiscriminatory reason for the employment
12 decision in question is pretextual." Lowe, supra, 775 F.2d at
13 1008. As the Court of Appeal noted in Lowe: "Statistical data
14 is relevant because it can be used to establish a general
15 discriminatory pattern in an employer's hiring or promotion
16 practices. Such a discriminatory pattern is probative of motive
17 and can therefore create an inference of discriminatory intent
18 with respect to the individual employment decision at issue."

19

20 Ashtiani in his request No 13, is requesting a document
21 that is relevant. The 10th Circuit, in McAlester v. United Air
22 Lines Inc. stated:

23 McAlester did not pursue his claim of racial
24 discrimination under Title VII, 42 U.S.C. §
25 2000e. McAlester then filed his present
complaint in federal district court alleging
deprivation of rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1981,
asserting that United failed to apply its

1 system of progressive discipline to him,
2 because white employees involved in similar
3 situations were not disciplined as severely.
4 McAlester sought reinstatement with back pay.
5 In support of his claim, McAlester presented
6 testimony of specific instances of individual
7 discrimination. McAlester was aware of other
white employees who violated similar rules for
which they could be terminated but were not. He
contends minorities and white employees were
disciplined differently because minorities were
terminated on their first offense.

8 The value of statistical evidence to prove discrimination
9 under Title VII is well articulated by the court in Boyd v.
10 Betchel Corp., 485 F.Supp. 610, 612-613 (N.D. CA 1979) :

12 "First generation: Title VII suits involved
13 overt intentional acts and policies which
14 were not difficult to discern as discriminatory,
15 such as the blanket exclusion of women from
16 certain positions regardless of their ability
to do the work Today, however, after
17 vigorous enforcement of our laws against
18 employment discrimination by government and
19 "private attorneys general," employers are aware
20 that their overall employment policies must, at
21 the very least, comply with the letter of the law.
22 Discrimination is likely to be found, if at all,
23 in the enforcement, at lower levels, of company-wide
24 policies which appear fair and reasonable on their
face. Many employers have enacted affirmative
action programs, and others, having contracts with
the government, are periodically inspected by federal
compliance agencies. Thus, if discrimination in
employment exists in large organizations it is
likely to be subtle, detectable, if at all, only
upon careful examination of sophisticated statistical
analysis. (Citations omitted.) (emphasis added).

1 In McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 804, 93
2 S.Ct. 1817, 1825 (1973), the Court stated that a plaintiff must
3 "be afforded a fair opportunity to show that (the employer's)
4 stated reason for (the employee's) rejection was in fact
5 pretext." The Court went on to point out that relevant evidence
6 on pretext includes the employer's "general policy and practice
7 with respect to minority employment. On the latter point,
8 statistics as to ... employment policy and practice may be
9 helpful to a determination of whether (the employer's conduct)
10 conformed to a general pattern of discrimination "

11 In Weahkee v. Norton, 621 F.2d 1080, 1083 (10th Cir. 1980),

12 we said, "(w)hen the employer has
13 come forward with legitimate
14 nondiscriminatory reasons for the
15 action contested, a plaintiff may
16 rely on statistics to discredit the
17 reasons the employer presented for
18 its action.

19 Bauer v. Bailar, 647 F.2d 1037, 1045 (10th Cir. 1981).

20 Plaintiffs' statistics alone support
21 the conclusion that black employees
22 as a class were discriminatorily
23 discharged. When considered with the
24 other evidence of record, that
25 conclusion is inescapable.

26 American National Bank, supra; see also, Chisholm v. United
27 Postal Service, supra; ; Williams v. Trans-World Airlines, 660
28 F.2d 1267 (8th Cir. 1981); Flowers v. Crouch-Walker, 552 F.2d

1 1277 (7th Cir. 1977); Bolton v. Murray Envelope, 493 F.2d 191
2 (5th Cir. 1974)

3 Analysis of the P-160's and P-187 document request 3 and 4
4 Of Mr. McKenzie and Mr. Hammer will show consistency with the
5 pattern of practice of the time of their promotion. It also will
6 conclude that under their management CMI has sent two of their
7 Mechanics to U.S District Court, Ashtiani In District of Guam.
8 Mr. Chuck Sanders In U.S District Court in Saipan. (REF Marianas
9 variety newspaper September 25, 2003.)

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12 D. Conclusion
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15 Plaintiff's request of documents may reveal that these
16 individuals all minorities were targeted by the new management,
17 and may reveal that the disparate treatment had impact on their
18 emotions and in fact what effect did it have on their lives.

19 Any documents referring or relating to the attitudes of
20 employees (Document Request 35) may reveal a level of
21 dissatisfaction on the part of CMI employees with CMI's response
22 or lack of response to employee concerns such as salary, "COLA"
23 or promotion practices effecting Guamanian, Locals or other
24 nationalities, the fact remains that CMI provides "COLA" (Cost
25 Of Living Allowance) to Group of Caucasians management and less

1 or none to Group of Local Managements. The reality of life is
2 that 1 [lb] of banana or a box of cereal at the store does not
3 change price tags based on one race, it costs the same. In its
4 Supplemental Answer to Request for Production, CMI has produced
5 certain documents requested regarding, e.g., its personnel and
6 operating policies and policies and/or procedures on racial
7 and/or national origin discrimination. Assuming such company-
8 wide policies appear "fair and reasonable on their face,"
9 Ashtiani should be permitted to discover all documents
10 requested, over CMI's objections, and submit them to statistical
11 analysis to determine whether "subtle" discriminatory patterns
12 or practices may be discerned. Ashtiani will heavily rely on
13 McAlester Vs. United Airlines, as he is similarly situated in
14 his case.

15

16 United asserts McAlester failed to prove intentional race
17 discrimination because he did not show specific racial animus on
18 the part of his supervisors. Id. 851 F.2d 1249 (10 th Cir.1988).
19 Ashtiani will prove even more based on direct evidence of E-
20 MAILS and statements that racial animus existed by supervisors
21 and directors.

22

23 Statistics may be used to prove the employer's racially
24 neutral reason for termination is purely pretext. Id., at 805, 93
25 S.Ct. at 1825; Anderson, 690 F.2d, at 802. When terminations are

1 often based on subjective evaluations of mitigating
2 circumstances, statistical evidence as to the overall
3 disciplinary practices of the employer is especially significant.

16 || Respectfully submitted,

18 this 7th day of October, 2003.

Tony H. Ashtiani

Plaintiff